Chain of Command

During Hurricane Katrina multiple levels of government were involved in cooperative federalism attempting to create need-based services in local neighborhoods. Mayor Ray Nagin poorly communicated his needs to Mayor Kathleen Blanco, Blanco took formidable action to initiate local services but poorly communicated her needs to President Bush and the federal government. The failure of the federal government can be partially accounted for by the Federal Emergency Management agency, which was under the poor, inexperienced leadership of Michael Brown. In the years that followed, the Select Bipartisan Committee to Investigate the Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina found that “too often there were too many cooks in the kitchen and because of that response Katrina was at times overdone, at times underdone. Too often, because everybody was in charge, nobody was in charge (2006, xi).” An intergovernmental model entitled “marble cake federalism” was at play during the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, which attempted to incorporate a sharing of functions and the prioritization of collaborative efforts. This form of cooperative federalism allowed for the sharing of information, need-based services, and resources that were available by the local, state, and national governments. However, the poor communication on multiple levels effected the ability to cooperatively coordinate an effective response. The luxury of an intergovernmental response begs the question if a top-down approach might be more favorable formed from a raison d'être of the meaning of government. Ostensibly, the aftermath of Katrina shows the need for more cooperative or more of a central decision-maker, because “there are no directions as to who should instigate a power move in the United States, it is done by chance, it is often done too late to be fully effective, and it frequently produces conflict among the several forces involved (Leach 1970, 61).”

The current administration tends to be in favor of an expanded role of the national government such as the formation of the Department of Homeland Security and the creation of National Response Plans, which would create a more centralized decision-maker. Expanding the role of the federal government might be a wise decision, as might be the decision to allow a layered approach centered on the local government and layered outwards. Nationally, decisions might be made without the priorities or knowledge of local decision making or the needs of local communities. While local decisions might not fully take advantage of state and national resources. In either case, a pre-formed plan from all three layers of government, might be useful in the event of an emergency. The executive findings found in The Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina: Lessons Learned suggested that “ultimately, when a catastrophic incident occurs, regardless of whether the catastrophe has been warned or is a surprise event, the Federal government should not rely on the traditional layered approach and instead should proactively provide, or ‘push’ its capabilities and assistance directly to those in need.” According to Mary and Robert Kweit the question is “whether such centralization is necessary or whether it is possible to respond effectively to disasters in an intergovernmental context (2006, 376).” Homeland security mandates suggested that the chain of command should be formed by the local government outward: the mayor, the Homeland Security department of New Orleans, the governor, the federal secretary of Homeland Security, the president. Interoperability between these different levels of power, suggests that all power should be centralized and formulated by the natural capacity and coordinated effort of the local level.